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Benefit cap and the complexity of discrimination: R (SG and others) v Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions, the Supreme Court evaluated the legality of the benefit cap. The 
Supreme Court was sharply divided but decided by a narrow margin that the benefit cap did 
not amount to a violation of the human rights. While the majority accepted the gender 
discrimination was justified, the Court noted that the current measures fall short of 
responsibilities under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This could 
prove of outmost importance as the government elected in May 2015 has announced further 
reductions to the existing benefit cap. The case comment evaluates whether the Court paid 
enough attention to the multifaceted nature of poverty and discrimination, and argues that the 
impact the benefit cap has had specifically on women from black and ethnic minorities 
should have been considered. 
 
Keywords: austerity – benefit cap – gender discrimination – European Convention on Human 
Rights – United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
Introduction 
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In R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions1, the Supreme Court was asked for the first time to rule on whether the 
benefit cap introduced by the coalition government in 2012 with the Benefit Cap (Housing 
Benefit) Regulations 2012 (the 2012 Regulations) was compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). By a narrow margin, the Court ruled that the benefit 
cap was not a violation of human rights, yet the Court considered a number of issues that 
might have wider significance in similar claims in the future, such as the inherent gender 
imbalance in the recent austerity measures and whether the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (UNCRC) could be applied in the proceedings. This case comment argues the Court 
should have paid more attention to the complexities of poverty and considered not only 
gender but also indirect racial discrimination. 
 
Background  
 
In 2012, the secretary of state introduced the 2012 Regulations2 which place a limit on the 
total amount of welfare benefits3 that most people aged 16 to 64 could receive from the state 
at £350 per week for single persons and £500 for families and couples, comparable to average 
annual salaries of £26,000 and £35,000 respectively. Following the ruling in SG, the 
conservative government elected in May 2015 has announced that the cap will be further 
                                                          
1 [2015] UKSC 16. 
2 Enacted under the Welfare Reform Act 2012, s 96 (2012 Act). 
3 The Regulations list welfare benefits as out-of-work benefits, child benefit, child tax credit and housing 
benefit. 
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reduced to £20,000 families outside London and £23,000 those living in London to further 
tackle ‘benefit dependency’ (HM Treasury 2015).  
The current cap is applied to all families equally, regardless of the size of the family or 
living costs. The government estimated that at least half of those impacted by the cap are 
living in the Greater London area where living costs, and therefore housing benefits, are 
higher than in the rest of the country (DWP 2012). The equality impact assessment by the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) also found that 60 per cent of those impacted by 
the scheme would be single women, where only 10 per cent of those were predicted to be 
single men. The secretary of state, therefore, accepted that the benefit cap disproportionally 
impacted women, lone mothers in particular, but argued this was justified under the 
socioeconomic policy for the following reasons: 
1) the need to achieve savings in public expenditure to ensure the economic well-being 
of the country; 
2) to set limit to the extent to which the state will support non-working households from 
public funds; 
3) to provide members of such households incentive to work.4 
There were four claimants in the proceedings: two single parents, NS and SG, and the 
youngest child of each respective single parent.5 The claimants argued that they were unable 
to mitigate the effects of the cap without finding work or moving home. SG, a single mother 
of six, had moved to Stamford Hill in London from Belgium. Both the mother and the oldest 
child had made allegations of sexual and physical abuse against the father. Her children 
attended a Jewish school in the locality and as orthodox Jews they had family and community 
                                                          
4 Supra n 1, [63-66].  
5 The facts were set out by the Court of Appeal in [2014] EWCA Civ 156, [13-18], and Lady Hale in [2015] 
UKSC 16, [169-177]. 
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support there. Following a rent increase, it would have been impossible for SG to continue 
living in their current home as it would have left the family with only £80 per week to live on 
once the cap was applied. The second applicant, NS, was also a single mother who lived in 
north London with three children. NS, who spoke only limited English and had not worked 
before, had left her husband following repeated sexual and physical abuse. Both SG and NS 
therefore showed they were in not in position to seek employment6 and that there were 
cultural and community support reasons for their desire not to relocate – yet, they were 
unable to maintain their current living arrangements due to the reduction in benefits.  
 
European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The benefit cap applied equally to men and women yet women, particularly single mothers, 
were disproportionately affected by it. The claimants issued judicial review proceedings, 
arguing that the cap was unlawful because: 
1. it indirectly discriminated against them as women and/or as victims of domestic 
violence contrary to Article 14 (Freedom from discrimination) as read with Article 1 
of the Protocol 1 (Right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions) of the ECHR; 
2. it breached the duty to consider the best interest of the child under Article 3 of the 
UNCRC. 
All five judges agreed that the cap was discriminatory against women but disagreed by a 
narrow margin whether the discrimination was justified due to legitimate aims. Giving the 
majority ruling, Lord Reed accepted the government justification for the measure and was of 
the view that beyond the aims put forward by the government, the cap was justified in order 
                                                          
6 Single people working 16h per week and couples 24h are excluded from the cap. 
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to restore public confidence in the welfare system.7  Furthermore, he stated that even if the 
savings from the cap were a relatively small part of the welfare budget, they nonetheless 
contributed to reducing the fiscal deficit. Following Stec v United Kindgom8, Lord Reed ruled 
that the 2012 Regulations were justified under the "manifestly without reasonable 
foundation" test. He further rejected arguments for alternative and more proportionate cap 
and said that decisions as to the level and content of the cap were "a matter of political 
judgement".9 He held that in applying Stec, the courts should consider that "certain matters 
are by their nature more suitable for determination by Government or Parliament than by the 
courts".10 Lady Hale, in contrast, argued that discrimination was a constitutional issue and 
said that "even in the area of welfare benefits, where the court would normally defer to the 
considered decision of the legislature, if that decision results in unjustified discrimination, 
then it is the duty of the courts to say so”.11 
Lord Reed concluded on the alleged gender discrimination that “the disparity between the 
numbers of men and women affected was inevitable if the legitimate aims were to be 
achieved”, a view that was supported by Lords Hughes and Carnwath.12 Lady Hale and Lord 
Kerr, in turn, were of the opinion that the discrimination could not be justified, and therefore 
the measures amounted to violation of Article 14. In her dissenting ruling, Lady Hale 
expressed concern not only over the discriminatory nature but also over the severity of the 
measures and stated that  
                                                          
7Supra n 1, [63-66]. 
8 (2006) 43 EHRR 47. 
9 Supra n 1, [69]. 
10 Supra n 1, [92]. 
11 Supra n 1, [160]. 
12Supra n 1, [76]. 
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the prejudicial effect of the cap is obvious and stark. It breaks the link between 
benefit and need. Claimants affected by the cap will, by definition, not receive 
the sums of money which the state deems necessary for them adequately to 
house, feed, clothe and warm themselves and their children.13 
The applicants claimed that the Regulations were not only discriminatory against 
women but also a disproportionate impact on victims of domestic violence. The majority 
rejected the claim as the government had already sufficiently addressed this after the 
proceedings in question had begun, by new regulations that exempts ‘specified 
accommodation’ from the cap, encompassing a wide range of accommodation provided for 
vulnerable people, including the women's refuges that were excluded from the exemption 
under the previous regulations. 14 
 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
The court was also divided on whether the benefit cap amounted to a violation of Article 3 of 
the UNCRC which states that “in all actions concerning children … the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration”. The UNCRC is an unincorporated international treaty 
and as such Lord Reed argued that it would be “inappropriate for the court to purport to 
decide whether or not the Executive has correctly understood unincorporated treaty 
                                                          
13Supra n 1, [180].  
14 The Housing Benefit and Universal Credit (Supported Accommodation) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (SI 
2014/771). However, Lady Hale noted that this exception only impacted the victims of domestic violence who 
had sought refuge in a shelter and not those who were in expensive temporary accommodation by the local 
authority. 
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obligation”.15 He rejected the argument put forward by the claimants that that it would be 
unrealistic to distinguish between the rights of the women under Article 14 of the ECHR and 
those of their children under the UNCRC, and argued that the UNCRC had no relevance on 
the issue of alleged discrimination between men and women in the enjoyment of the property 
rights guaranteed by A1P1. Lord Hughes also argued that Article 3 of UNCRC cannot have 
effect in this case on Article 8 on ‘the grounds that it is irrelevant to its interpretation’.16  
Lord Carnwath, Lady Hale and Lord Reed, in contrast, found that the state fell short 
of its obligations under the UNCRC. While Lord Carnwath argued that the state had failed to 
show that the best interest of the child had been a primary consideration in these measures, 
swinging the vote he agreed with Lords Reed and Hughes on the narrow point that Article 3 
could not be used to support Article 14 of the ECHR in the case grounded on alleged gender 
discrimination. Voicing his concern, Lord Carnwath said he hoped the government would 
address the implications of the ruling when it reviewed the benefit cap.17 
Lord Kerr argued in a strong dissenting judgment that the violations of Article 3 of 
UNCRC and 14 of ECHR were intertwined as the “interests of single mothers are ... 
inextricably bound up with the interests of their dependent children, for the trite and prosaic 
reason that they are parents”.18 Concurring with Lady Hale on the breach of Article 3, Lord 
Kerr said “depriving children of (and therefore their mothers of the capacity to ensure that 
they have) these basic necessities of life is simply antithetical to the notion that first 
consideration has been given to their best interests”.19 
                                                          
15 Supra n 1, [90]. 
16 Supra n 1, [139]. 
17 Supra n 1, [133]. 
18Supra n 1, [266]. 
19Supra n 1, [269]. 
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He also argued that the Article 3 should be directly applicable in domestic courts, 
contradicting the commonly accepted dualist theory that international conventions must be 
incorporated into domestic law for them to be applicable in domestic courts. He argued the 
dualist system allows the state to play politics with fundamental rights by showing superficial 
commitment through signatories but keeping the rights beyond reach of its citizens. Beyond 
interpretation of legality of welfare cuts, Lord Kerr’s comments are potentially far-reaching 
and constitutionally groundbreaking. Considering the recent hostile political attitude towards 
ECHR and international human rights instruments, the position will no doubt face substantial 
resistance. 
 
Comment 
 
Perhaps Lord Kerr’s comments on the direct applicability of the UNCRC will prove to have a 
long-lasting, possibly revolutionary, impact in the future. Arguably, there are other issues left 
unaddressed by the ruling, most notably the intersectionality of discrimination in the austerity 
measures. Lord Reed concluded stating that the court is concerned whether the law 
“unlawfully discriminates between men and women, rather than with the hardship which 
might result from the cap in the cases of those most severely affected”.20 Yet, the question of 
who are those most severely affected is closely intertwined with the discrimination claim, and 
with the legitimacy of the austerity measures. 
The disproportionate impact of the austerity measures on women has been recognised 
by feminist commentators for long (Griffin 2015; Bramall 2013) but the impact on women 
who are from ethnic minorities have received less attention (Sandhu and Stephenson 2015). 
                                                          
20 Supra n 1, [75]. 
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All the judges recognised the gender imbalance in the measures but they underplayed the fact 
that the applicants were also of immigrant and ethnic minority background. While the 
austerity measures and the benefit cap in particular have hit women the hardest, it must also 
be recognised that not all women are equal. According to the Equality Impact Assessment on 
the benefit cap, the DWP estimated that 40 per cent of households impacted by the benefit 
cap will have at least one person who is BME (DWP 2012). After housing costs, nearly 40 
per cent of BME households were living on a relative low income, in comparison to 20 per 
cent of white households (DWP 2014). The benefit cap, therefore, is likely to have a 
disproportionate impact on BME women in particular and the failure of the Court to consider 
this is remarkable. Based on governments own consultations and equality assessments, the 
benefit cap and wider austerity measures will hit BME single mothers living in London the 
hardest. Yet, this was not acknowledged by the secretary of state or by the Court. Lord Reed 
said government policies to incentivise work are not purely cut based but are introduced 
together with support to return to work. While this might be the case for some, BME women 
– the hardest hit - have faced a combination of cuts to welfare benefits and cuts to funding of 
services such as English as a Second or other Language (ESOL). Poor language skills and 
lack of support, as evident in the case of the second claimant NS, present obvious difficulties 
to entry into the work market and access to state services.  
The judges, Lord Reed in particular, relied heavily on government consultation and 
responses to understand and outline the austerity measures and their justification, 
incentivising work in particular. The government emphasised the importance of behaviour 
change, an argument accepted by the majority, and stated in an earlier consultation (quoted in 
part in the judgement) that “the aim of the benefit cap policy is to achieve long-term positive 
behavioural effects through changed attitudes to welfare, responsible life choices and strong 
work incentives”(DWP 2013). ‘Long-term positive behaviour change’ implies that the 
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welfare system or those in receipt of welfare benefits demonstrate irresponsible behaviour 
and crudely juxtapositions them to the ‘good, productive citizens’ (Lonergan 2015). The 
majority, while sensitive to the plight of impoverished children, placed the responsibility of 
lifting children from poverty to their parents, in this case single mothers. If it is accepted that 
the benefit cap and wider austerity measures disproportionately impact single mother 
households, then it must also be accepted that emphasis on the responsibility to raise a new 
generation of economically productive citizens, is also deeply gendered. The push for BME 
single mothers to work and imposing punitive measures on those who do not, is paradoxical 
when read together with the cuts to services such as ESOL.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The case shows the Court is deeply divided over the controversial measures to reform the 
welfare state. While the powerful individual rulings condemn the UK’s failure to protect the 
poorest children, the Court was not able to engage with the complex, multifaceted nature of 
poverty. The measures and the Court’s ruling ultimately fail to take into account that the 
welfare state and therefore any cuts to it are, and have always been, intensely gendered and 
racialised.  
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